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Background and Goals
The Internet has become a fertile ground for hostile ac-
tivity. One of the simplest yet most effective attacks that can
be launched over the network is a denial of service (DoS) at-
tack. The most trivial form of a DoS attack ﬂoods the target
with packets, causing congestion and consuming all avail-
able network resources. In order to employ massive attack
power, the attacker usually launches a distributed denial of
service (DDoS) attack, in which several subordinate hosts
ﬂood the target in concert.
Traditionally, DoS attacks were performed at the net-
work level. As a result, various network-level solutions
have emerged. One type of readily available and cheap so-
lution uses an existing ﬁrewall or router to perform rate-
limiting of trafﬁc and ﬁltering of packets according to
header ﬁelds like address and port number. Since most rea-
sonable networks already contain the necessary hardware
regardless of DoS attacks, this solution is very appealing.
However, these solutions have limited effectiveness. Spoof-
ing of headers that match the ﬁltering criteria can be easily
performed, and although rate-limiting stops networks from
being overwhelmed, it indiscriminately discards messages.
Another type of solution uses expensive devices pro-
posed by commercial companies. These solutions rely on
additional, costly hardware and software that perform com-
plex computations to track incoming packets and decide on
an action to take. Indeed, such solutions can identify and
isolate the DoS attack much better than the simple solutions
presented above. However, complex and expensive systems
are not suitable for most organizations.
As network-level DoS defenses are becoming more read-
ily available, we can identify a shift of trends in the attack-
ers’ strategy. Since applications tend to perform much more
computations per packet than a network-level mechanism
does, less trafﬁc is needed to cause the application to ex-
haust all CPU resources and fail to handle valid requests.
Hence, an easy application-level DoS attack is in effect.
Another testament for this important problem was given
in 1999 by The Committee on Information Systems and
Trustworthiness. The committee declared that defending
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against DoS attacks is very important, but there are no
systematic design methods nor mechanisms for doing so.
Moreover, the committee found that ad-hoc solutions for
DoS, as used in time-sharing systems, are inadequate for
use in networks. The main problem lies in the fact that
no framework for reasoning about the effectiveness of any
mechanism nor for comparing various solutions exists.
Leveraging Net-Level Mechanisms for Quan-
tiﬁably Superior App-Level DoS-Resistance
Our work thus far makes the ﬁrst step in giving answers
to the serious issues posed above. We believe that the
proper way to tackle the problem is through a dual-layer
approach. On the one hand, we want to exploit cheap and
simple measures at the network layer. On the other hand,
we would like to leverage these network mechanisms at the
application layer so as to achieve effective DoS resistance.
This higher layer allows for more complex algorithms as it
has to deal with signiﬁcantly less packets than the network
layer does, and may have closer interaction with the appli-
cation. An exemplar algorithm may use random ports for
communication, thus reducing the probability of spooﬁng
to the bare minimum. We feel that such a dual approach
allows for a cheap, simple, effective, and perhaps most im-
portantly, generic defense against DoS attacks for entire
classes of applications. Such generic mechanisms, e.g., a
DoS-resistant two-party communication channel [1], or a
DoS-resistant multicast protocol [2], can also be used as
building blocks in devising even more elaborate solutions
for intricate classes of applications.
As shown in the previous section, there is a strong need
for a formal framework for understanding and analyzing
the effects of proposed solutions to the application-level
DoS problem. The main challenge in attempting to formal-
ize DoS-resistance for the ﬁrst time is coming up with ap-
propriate models for the attacker and the environment, as
well as for functionality that can be provided by network-
layer mechanisms such as ﬁrewalls.
Consider for example timing assumptions. When we de-
signaservicefortheInternet, itisattractivetomodeltheen-
vironment as asynchronous, so as to allow for unpredictable
1delays. Conversely, weobservethatanattackerthatcontrols
timing can cause DoS without sending any bogus messages,
simply by delaying application messages long enough for
an unbounded number of them to reach their target simulta-
neously. While DoS due to timing delays is a realistic con-
cern, such extreme timing delays and pile-up effects are not
the main concern one usually worries about in the context
of DoS attacks. The more realistically harmful DoS attacks
generally arise from heavy trafﬁc of bogus requests gener-
ated by the attacker. Modeling the attacker as having com-
plete control over timing would not allow for any meaning-
ful discussion of such realistic attacks. Instead, we should
deﬁne a model where the severity of the impact of the attack
on the application is directly related to the amount of bogus
messages an attacker can send. At the same time, the at-
tacker should be allowed some realistic control over timing.
Similar considerations arise when deﬁning the attacker’s
ability to snoop on protocol messages and to promptly react
to them. We present some model variants in [1].
We brieﬂy sketch our proposed scheme for mitigating
DoS attacks on end hosts. Our network communication is
based on ports. We denote the maximum possible reception
rate of the receiver by R messages per time unit. Similarly,
the maximum sending capacity of the adversary is denoted
by C. The ratio C
R tells us how strong the adversary is com-
pared to the target, e.g., the ratio C
R can be the number of
hosts under the attacker’s control.
The ﬁrst level of defense is implemented within a router
orasimilardevice. Weassume thatthere isaseparate buffer
with distinct resources for each port, The application can
determine the number of messages to read from each buffer
every time unit, as long as the total number of messages
read is at most R. The messages that are delivered to the
application are chosen randomly from the buffers, and the
rest of the messages are discarded. We note that although
this description assumes unbounded buffers, it is very easy
to implement the same service using ﬁxed-size buffers.
Using this model for the network layer, we have been
able to prove some general theorems. We say that a blind
attack is in progress, if the attacker does not know the port
it needs to attack. Otherwise, we call the attack a directed
attack. We show that a blind attack causes insigniﬁcant
damage with relation to a directed attack [1], where dam-
age is the probability of a valid message that reaches the
router/ﬁrewall to be forwarded for further processing, rather
than discarded.
Clearly, what is left to be done is to make sure the at-
tackerhasnegligiblechancesofﬁndingtheportthecommu-
nication is taking place on. We can now utilize the network-
level mechanisms to design higher-level protocols that en-
sure resistance to DoS attacks. Some application-level pro-
tocolswehavedevelopedforthiscauseuserandomports, or
use pseudorandom port hopping to evade the attacker [2, 1].
Future Research Directions
The two main ideas presented above, the dual-layer ap-
proach and the formal framework, deﬁne a very large design
space. We believe that this important topic allows for much
research. We now list some possible research directions.
Evidently, choosing the class of applications to pro-
tect may inﬂuence the protection scheme. Thus far we
have looked at multicast and two-party communication.
Other application classes we are currently pursuing, such as
client-server communication, may require adaptation of our
proposed schemes, and clearly call for a separate analysis.
Naturally, one cannot determine the efﬁcacy of a proto-
col with no proper adversary model. An extremely impor-
tant research direction in this context is therefore examining
a range of attacker/environment models, perhaps deﬁning a
taxonomy of them, and studying the possibilities and limits
of DoS-resistance in these models. Good models allow us
to analyze attacks as they happen “in the wild”, and to ﬁnd
the adversary’s best strategy, or an upper bound thereof.
Once deciding on a speciﬁc protocol to protect a class
of applications, many other considerations come into mind.
Should redundant ports be used? What are the tradeoffs be-
tween redundancy and over-provisioning on the one hand
and success rate on the other? How far is the chosen proto-
col from optimality and what is the proper metric?
Additionally, it is worthwhile to consider how crypto-
graphic solutions to DoS problems, such as “proof of work”
solutions, come into play in these settings. Using crypto-
graphic primitives in DoS-mitigating protocols may raise
other questions. E.g., the two-party port-hopping commu-
nication protocols presented in [1] use a shared secret to
generate the pseudorandom hopping sequence. Devising an
automated, DoS-resistant initialization process that shares
the secret is an important direction for future research.
As for the lower levels, it is interesting to study various
other formal models for the network layer. It is important
to link the theoretical research to actuality by evaluating the
models’ effectiveness, feasibility and utility. For example,
one can examine current router implementations and deter-
mine how they relate to proposed models, and how effective
they are as an infrastructure for dealing with application-
level DoS attacks.
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